This paper studies the physical consequences of a class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks in which both state and topology data for a sub-network of the network are changed by an attacker to mask a physical attack. The problem is formulated as a two-stage optimization problem, which aims to cause overload in a line of the network with limited attack resources. It is shown that unobservable stateand-topology cyber-physical attacks as studied in this paper can make the system operation more vulnerable to line outages and failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE ELECTRIC power system is a complex cyberphysical system and is monitored by an intelligent cyber layer which includes: (i) a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system; and (ii) an energy management system (EMS) that process the SCADA data. Network topology is important system data used in various data processing modules in the EMS. Changes in topology can result from either system incidents or malicious physical attacks; but, in general, such topology alterations can be detected in the cyber layer. However, a sophisticated attacker can launch cyber attacks that alter the topology information in an unobservable manner; furthermore, they can also mask a physical attack via a cyber attack to create a more coordinated attack. Such cyber-physical attacks can result in wrong EMS solutions with potential serious consequences. Therefore, it is instructive to fully understand such attack consequences as a first step to thwart them.
There has been much recent interest in understanding both the physical and cyber security challenges facing the electric power system. While there has been focus on the consequences of physical attacks on the system operation (e.g., [1] ), those of cyber as well as coordinated cyber-physical attacks are less understood. In this paper, we introduce a class of The authors are with the School of Electrical, Computer, and Energy Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85281 USA (e-mail: jzhan188@asu.edu; lalithasankar@asu.edu).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TSG. 2016.2552178 unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks in AC state estimation (SE) and focus on fully understanding its consequences.
A. State of Art 1) False Data Injection (FDI) Attacks: In [2] , Liu et al. first introduce a class of FDI attacks on DC SE. In [3] , Hug and Giampapa focus on FDI attacks on AC SE and introduce a class of unobservable attacks that are limited to a sub-graph of the networks. They demonstrate that though AC SE is vulnerable to unobservable FDI attacks, it requires the knowledge of both system topology and states to launch such attacks. More recently, the attacks in [4] by Liang et al. study attack consequences by introducing a class of unobservable FDI attacks for AC SE and demonstrate that such attacks can lead to a physical generation re-dispatch and line overflow.
Recent works [5] and [6] have shown that when the attacker has limited topology information, there is no longer guarantee that specific data integrity attacks are unobservable relative to bad data detection. While our attack is unobservable for multiple reasons including the fact that the attacker performs AC SE, in this paper we assume that the attacker has complete topology information.
2) Topology Attacks: Unobservable cyber attacks on topology can be of two types: line-maintaining and line-removing. For a line-maintaining attack, the attacker changes measurements and line status information to make it appear that line that is not in the system is now shown as active at the control center via SCADA data; the opposite is achieved by a line-removing attack. For both line-removing and linemaintaining attacks, an attack can either change only topology data (i.e., state-preserving topology attack) or both state and topology data (i.e., state-and-topology attack). The class of unobservable cyber topology attacks is first introduced in [7] ; however, the analysis in [7] is restricted to a subclass of state-preserving line-removing attacks in which an attacker changes topology information of the system without changing the states.
3) Line-Maintaining Attacks: This sub-class of topology attacks requires both physical line outage and cyber attack to mask the physical topology alteration and have not been studied yet in the literature. In this work, we study the linemaintaining cyber-physical attacks in which both physical and cyber topology are changed by the attacker. In [8] , we consider unobservable state-preserving line-maintaining attacks (i.e., only topology data is changed) for which we develop an algorithm using breadth-first search (BFS) to find the smallest sub-network required to launch such an attack. However, changing only topology and not changing states limits the number of feasible lines amenable to attack and also requires large load shifts at the end buses of a target line. Therefore, in this work, we determine attacks that change both state and topology.
4) Attack Consequences: There has been much focus on effect of attacks on operation costs [9] , [10] and electricity markets [11] , [12] ; in contrast, as in [4] and [13] , this paper highlights physical system consequences of cyber-physical attacks. Furthermore, attacks designed for specific consequences can be modeled as two-stage optimization problems where the first stage models the attack design with constraints that capture attacker's limitation and the second stages models the system response (see [9] , [10] , [13] ). In this paper, we also use a two-stage optimization problem to find unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attack that can maximize power flow on a chosen line. Furthermore, due to the combination of physical and cyber attacks, we employ such a two-stage attack twice as detailed in the sequel.
B. Contributions
The contributions of this paper are two-fold. First, we introduce a class of unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks in which an attacker can change both cyber state and topology data to enable a coordinated physical and cyber attack on AC SE. Such an attack consists of a physical attack to first trip a transmission line, followed by a cyber attack that masks the physical attack. The goal is to overload a chosen line (different from tripped line) while avoiding being detected by both SE and the subsequent modules.
Our attack model also captures the realistic limitation that the attacker can only access a sub-network of the entire power system, and therefore, can take down a line and modify the measurements only inside the sub-network. To this end, we can solve a two-stage optimization problem to determine the attack. However, since both physical attack and the re-dispatch resulting from cyber attack can lead to state changes, two attack vectors are required to enable the above two state changes and ensure the unobservability of the attack. Therefore, we formulate a two-step strategy to determine the attack.
The second contribution of our work is to demonstrate the consequences of the worst cyber-physical attacks determined by the proposed attack strategy on AC SE and AC OPF. We show that the cyber-physical attacks introduced here can successfully lead to line overflows in the IEEE 24-bus system with limited size of attack sub-network and load shifts.
Finally, we note that our attack model is general enough to capture the following classes of cyber-based FDI state and/or topology attacks: (i) unobservable FDI attacks that only change states, (ii) unobservable cyber topology attacks that only change topology information using measurement data; and (iii) unobservable cyber state-and-topology attacks that change both state and topology information. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the general system model. Section III introduces the attack model. Section IV presents a two-step attack strategy to identify the worst-case overflow attack. Section V analyzes the numerical results for a test system. Section VI draws the conclusion of this paper and presents the future works.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the mathematical formulation for the various computational units of power system operation, including system network and topology, state estimation, and optimal power flow. Throughout, we assume there are n b buses, n br branches, n g generators, and n z measurements in the system. In Fig. 1 , we illustrate a typical temporal sequence of data processing units in the cyber layer.
A. System Network and Topology
The electric power system can be represented by a graph G = {N , E} where N and E are the sets of buses and lines, respectively.
At the control center, SCADA collects line status data as a n br × 1 vector s with entries s k ∈ {0, 1} for k ∈ {1, . . . , n br } that indicate the on and off status of circuit-breaker on each line. The data is then passed to a topology processor to map the real-time power system topology. Each s corresponds to a specific system topology G.
B. State Estimation
Consider an n z × 1 vector z of nonlinear measurements (for AC SE) given as
where x = [θ, V] T is the system state vector, and e is an n z × 1 noise vector which is independent of x and is modeled as Gaussian distributed with 0 mean and σ 2 i covariance such that the measurement error covariance matrix is given by
The function h(x, G) is a vector of nonlinear functions that describes the relationship between the system states and measurements for a topology G.
We use weighted least-squares (WLS) AC SE to calculate the θ and V [14] . Subsequent to SE, bad data detector use χ 2 −test to detect bad data and bad data identification use largest normalized residual method to filter the bad data.
C. Optimal Power Flow
The OPF problem can be written as
where x = [θ, V, P G , Q G ] T is the optimization vector with voltage angle θ , voltage magnitude V that are both n b × 1 vectors, and active power generation P G , reactive power generation Q G that are both n g × 1 vectors; C(·) denotes the cost function of x; F(·) denotes the equivalent constraints (power balance constraints); T(·) denotes the inequivalent constraints (power flow limits).
III. ATTACK MODEL
The unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attack considered here models both a physical attack and a coordinated cyber attack.
We assume the attacker has the following capabilities: 1) Attacker has knowledge of the topology G 0 of entire network prior to physical attacks. 2) Attacker has the capability to launch physical attack, and observe and change measurements only for a sub-graph S of G 0 . The choice of S is described in detail in the sequel. 3) Attacker has the capability to perform SE and compute modified measurements for S. 4) Attacker has knowledge of the capacity and operation cost of every generator in the network. 5) Attacker has historic data of load patterns and generation dispatch of the entire network. We assume that the power system is observable before and after the physical attack. We assume that an intelligent attacker can learn the system information a priori, e.g., by hacking into the system databases and learning the system models and functions ahead of time. Moreover, attacker can also replace the generation data with public market data such as locational marginal prices and quantities to construct the attacks.
In this paper, we focus only on physical attacks that target transmission lines. We denote the line that is physically tripped by the attacker as the switching attack line and the two end buses of this line as the switching attack buses. Assume the switching attack line is line t and the topology prior to the physical attack is G 0 . The physical line status for line t changes from s t = 1 to s t = 0 after the physical attack and the corresponding physical topology changes to G.
In general, a physical attack will be subsequently detected by the topology processing unit in the EMS and the system topology will be updated shortly after the detection. However, a sophisticated attacker can hide such physical attacks by launching an unobservable cyber attack. In the resulting unobservable cyber topology attack, the attacker modifies line status as well as related bus measurements to alter the system topology G to a different "target" topologyḠ = {N,Ē}. Since the attacker's aim is to hide the topology alteration caused by the physical attack,Ḡ should be chosen as G 0 .
To launch a state-and-topology attack, the attacker injects n br × 1 line status attack vector b and n z × 1 measurement attack vector a. The attack vector b for line status overrides the physical change on line t's status by setting for b k = 0 for k = t and b k = 1 for k = t. These changes lead to a new system statex for the system under attack. This attack modifies (s, z) for topology G to (s,z) for topologyḠ such that
In the absence of noise, the measurement attack vector satisfies
For nonlinear measurement model and AC SE, we model a sophisticated attacker who attacks measurements and line status data for a sub-graph S of the network by first estimating the system statesx inside S using AC SE. The attacker then chooses a small set of buses in S to change states from the estimatex tox =x + c such that the measurement vectorz after cyber attack has entries
where I S denotes the set of measurements inside S. We use the following method to identify the sub-graph S for an unobservable state-and-topology attack. Throughout, we distinguish two types of buses: load buses with presence of load and non-load buses with no load. 1) Use the optimization problem (the details are in the sequel) to determine the load buses from the attack vector c whose states need to be changed (defined as center bus) to enable the attack. 2) Include all center buses in S.
3) Extend S by including all buses and branches connected
to the buses inside S. 4) If there are non-load buses on the boundary of S, extend S by including all adjacent buses of the non-load boundary buses and the corresponding branches. 5) Repeat 4) until all boundary buses of S are load buses. 6) Check if there is a path (actual bus and branch connection) in S that can connect the two switching attack buses. If such path exits, then S is the attack sub-graph. If there is no such path, go to Step 7). 7) Use BFS method to find the shortest path connecting the two switching attack buses. Include the shortest path in S. Then this S is the attack sub-graph. Steps 1)−5) ensure the boundary buses of S are load buses with states unchanged. For a non-load bus in S, since the injection of non-load buses are known to the control center, the attacker should ensure that under an attack, the net injection is equal to the net flow into the bus. Thus, the state changes for non-load buses are dependent on those for the neighboring load buses. Furthermore, the state of a boundary bus j is computed using both measurements inside and outside S. j th state, then the corresponding j th entry of the attack vector should satisfy c j = 0 to ensure the attack to be unobservable. Thus, a boundary bus cannot have a state change, and therefore, cannot be a non-load buses.
Steps 6) and 7) ensure that the states of switching attack buses can be estimated with measurements inside S. To maintain the switching attack line as active in the cyber layer, the attacker needs to modify the line status as well as power flow measurements on the switching attack line and power injection measurements on the switching attack buses. This in turn, requires the attacker to estimate the states of switching attack buses to create the false measurements. However, since this line is physically disconnected, the attacker needs to use an algorithm such as BFS to determine an alternate shortest path connecting the 2 switching attack buses, and thereby estimate the states and changed measurements. In general, state change is required for at least one of the switching attack buses. This bus, thereby, will be included in S. However, S may not include the entire physical path. Thus, the attacker needs steps 6) and 7) to complete the path.
IV. ATTACK STRATEGY
In this section, we study the worst-case cyber-physical attacks with the following capabilities: (a) physically trip a switching attack line and mask the physical attack with a cyber attack; (b) maximize power flow on a target line; and (c) avoid detectability by limiting load shift via changes in measurements. The attack resources available to the attacker may also be limited. We model this limitation by constraining the size of sub-network the attacker has access to. This leads to a constrained optimization problem. As noted before, two attack vectors are needed since both physical and cyber attacks result in state and topology changes. The corresponding optimization problems are described below.
Our two-step optimization problem captures the temporal nature of attack sequence involving a physical attack followed by several cyber attacks. In Fig. 2 , we illustrate this temporal sequence of attack and system events. The system events are periodic and are denoted by S t for the t th event. At the start of each S t , data is collected from SCADA and by the end of S t , i.e., the start of S t+1 , data is processed in the EMS. There are 2 attack instances, A 0 and A 1 to denote the physical and cyber attack events, respectively. We assume the physical attack event A 0 is launched immediately after the start of the 0 th system event, i.e., S 0 , and the coordinated cyber attack event A 1 is launched shortly after, but before the start of next system event S 1 . Following this cyber-physical attack pair (A 0 , A 1 ), the cyber attack is sustained between every two system events to maintain the worst generation dispatch, and thereby, sustain the maximal power flow on the target line. In Table I , we denote how the cyber (measured) and physical (actual) data including generation dispatch, system state, topology, and loads vary at all system and attack events.
Assume the system topology and the generation at S 0 areḠ and P 0 G , respectively. From Table I , we can see that the system physical topology changes to G after the physical attack in A 0 . The physical operation states, thereby, change to θ 0 . The attacker then injects cyber attack vector c 0 in A 1 to change the load pattern from the physical load P D to the false cyber loadP D to mask the physical topology alteration. The physical and cyber loads at attack event A 1 satisfy the following relationships, respectively:
where A GN is n b ×n g generator-to-bus connectivity matrix; H 1 andH 1 are n b × n b dependency matrices between power injection and voltage angle for G andḠ, respectively. Subtracting the two equations in (9), the cyber loads are related to the physical loads as
The false cyber loadP D and topologyḠ leads to a system redispatch to the optimal generation dispatch P * G at S 1 . Since the attacker optimization problem at each step models the system response, such an optimal dispatch will cause maximal power flow on the target line. Following this first cyber attack A 1 , since the generation dispatch changes at S 1 , the physical system states also change to θ * . To sustain both the optimal dispatch P * G and the false cyber topologyḠ at the next system event, i.e., S 2 , the attacker needs to maintain the false cyber loadP D by injecting another attack vector c at A 2 . Thus, the nodal power balance at attack event A 2 in the cyber layer is:
where the right hand side terms represent the cyber load modified at A 1 . In the following attack events, i.e., A t , t = 3, . . . , T, the attacker can keep injecting c to maintain the false cyber loadP D . This in turn ensures that the optimal dispatch and the false cyber topology are maintained at P * G andḠ, respectively, and the maximal power flow on the target line is sustained.
To model the cyber-physical attack events A 0 , A 1 , and A 2 between S 0 and S 1 , the optimization problem should capture the power balance relationship shown in (11) . However, since the switching attack line is determined by the optimization problem, both H 1 and θ 0 are unknown before solving the problem. On the other hand, for the pure cyber attack events A 2 and A 3 , the power balance in the cyber layer is
This is equivalent to the physical power balance as
Note that H 1 θ is the physical power injection vector. For each bus, the power injection also equals to the sum of power flow on the branches connecting to the bus. Therefore, we can use the vector of the sum of power flow on the branches connecting to each bus, to replace H 1 θ and eliminate H 1 as
where A KN is the n b × n br branch-to-bus connectivity matrix, H 2 is the n br × n b dependency matrix between power flow and voltage angle forḠ, s is the line status vector, diag(s) represents the diagonal matrix of s, P K is the n br × 1 power flow vector. In (14) , the sum of physical power flows on the set of branches connected to a bus is utilized to calculate the physical power injection at the bus. In (15), the physical power flow vector is represented by the diagonal matrix of line status vector s multiply the cyber power flow vector, i.e.,H 2 θ * . That is, if a line t is selected as the switching attack line, the power flow P Kt on line t is forced to be 0, otherwise, P Kt =H 2 (t, :)·θ , whereH 2 (t, :) represents the t th row ofH 2 . Therefore, instead of directly modeling the physical attack event A 0 and cyber attack events A 1 and A 2 between S 0 and S 1 , we use the first step optimization problem to model the pure cyber attack events A 2 and A 3 between S 1 and S 2 to determine the attack vector c for a fixed but undermined topology G. Such a c should be subject to bounds on both the attacker's sub-graph size and the load shifts and can lead to the worst dispatch P * G . Note that P * G is the worst dispatch that can lead to the maximal power flow on the target line under physical topology G and physical load P D . Once the line to attack is determined, we need the second step optimization to find the attack vector c 0 for θ 0 that also ensures the worst dispatch P * G . With modifications in (14) and (15), we can then model the first step as a two-stage optimization problem, and hence, the switching attack line can also be determined as the solution of the optimization problem. After the switching attack line and the cyber attack vector c are both determined, the attack subgraph S can be identified with the process stated in Section III. The details of this problem are described in Section IV-A. This step can be assumed as an off-line computation since no real-time information is required in the two-stage optimization problem.
In the second step of the optimization, we compute the attack vector c 0 at A 1 . We again use a two-stage optimization problem to determine the c 0 such that the optimal generation dispatch for this problem is forced to be same as that in Step 1. We, henceforth, define the attack vector solved in the second step as the initial attack vector. The details of the second step is introduced in Section IV-B. This step can be assumed as an on-line attack determination since it requires the real-time physical states data.
The attack vectors c and c 0 are both DC attack vectors that can be detected by AC SE. Thus, to ensure the unobservability of the attacks, the attacker should construct two AC attacks with c and c 0 . This procedure is introduced in Section IV-C.
A. Step 1: Maximize Power Flow on a Line
In Step 1, we introduce a two-stage optimization problem to determine the attack vector c and the switching attack lines such that the target line l in the attacker's sub-graph S has maximal power flow subject to specific constraints as explained in the sequel. The two-stage optimization is
where the variables: P K is the n br × 1 vector of physical branch power flow; c is the n b × 1 attack vector; s is the n br × 1 line status vector; θ, θ * are the n b × 1 state variable vector and optimal state variable vector solved by DCOPF, respectively; P G , P * G are the n g × 1 vectors of generation dispatch variables and optimal generation dispatch variables solved by DCOPF, respectively; λ is the n b × 1 dual variable vector for all equal constraints in DCOPF; μ + , μ − are the n br ×1 dual variable vectors of the upper and lower bound constraints of thermal limits, respectively; α + , α − are the n g × 1 dual variable vectors of the upper and lower bound constraints of generator capacity, respectively; and the parameters: P D is the n b × 1 vector of active load at each bus; N 0 is the l 0 -norm constraint integer; N T is the maximum number of switching attack lines;
H 1 is the n b × n b matrix of dependencies between power injection measurements and state variables forḠ; H 2 is the n nb × n b matrix of dependencies between power flow measurements and state variables forḠ; A GN is the n nb × n g identity matrix of generators;
is the cost function of the g th generator; P max K is the n br × 1 vector of line thermal limit; P min G , P max G are n g × 1 vectors of minimum and maximum generator output, respectively; τ is the load shift factor; ζ the weight of the norm of attack vector c. L the set of load buses. The goal of the attack in (16) is a multi-objective problem which includes maximizing the power flow on the target line l to create an overflow, while minimizing the l 0 -norm of the attack vector, i.e., minimizing the attack sub-graph size. The power flow on l is maximized along the direction of the power flow prior to attack. In the first stage, constraints (17)−(19) model the following attacker limitations: (i) only up to N T switching attack lines can be physically tripped; (ii) alter up to N 0 load-bus states; and (iii) limit cyber load shifts to at most τ P D ; respectively. The second stage optimization represents DC OPF, whose aim is to minimize operation cost in (20), subject to power balance constraints in (21) and (22), thermal limit constraint in (23), and generation limit constraint in (24).
This two-stage optimization problem is nonlinear and nonconvex. For tractability, we modify several constraints.
Constraint (22) is a nonlinear constraint which includes the product of binary variable s and continuous variable θ . It can be replaced by a linear form as follows
where β ± and γ ± are n br × 1 dual variable vectors for the corresponding constraints and M 1 is a large number. Constraint (18) is an l 0 −norm constraint on the attack vector, which is nonlinear and non-convex. It can be relaxed to a corresponding l 1 −norm constraint as:
However, constraint (26) is still nonlinear. We, thus, linearize it as follows:
where u is n load × 1 non-negative slack variable vector.
Once the attack vector determined by s and c is given in the first stage optimization problem, the second stage DCOPF problem (20)−(24) and (25) is then convex. The second stage optimization problem can then be replaced by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions as follows:
where the ∇ is the partial gradient operator, constraint (28) is the partial gradient optimal condition, (29)−(32) are the complementary slackness constraints, (21)−(24) and (25) are the primal feasibility constraints, and (33) represents the dual feasibility constraints. Particularly, the complementary slackness constraints (29)−(32) are nonlinear since they include product of continuous variables. We then linearize them by introducing new binary variables δ μ ± , δ α ± , δ β ± , and δ γ ± . For instance, constraint (29) can be rewritten as
where M is a large positive number. Constraints (30)−(32) can be linearized using the same method. Particularly, for the linearized forms of constraints (31) and (32), M 1 and M are different values and M 1 M. Using the approximate relaxation for the various constraints as detailed above, we obtain the following equivalent singlestage mixed-integer linear problem with the objective
subject to (17), (19), (21), (23)−(25), (27), (28), (33), (34), and the linearized forms of constraints (30)−(32). Note that since no real-time data is required in the above optimization problem, the attacker can solve this step offline to determine the switching attack line to trip and the attack vector c.
Remark 1: Note that the attack optimization problem presented above can also model the sub-class of pure unobservable cyber attacks including FDI attacks that only change states, cyber topology attacks that only change topology information, and pure cyber state-and-topology attacks that change both state and topology information. When N T in (17) is set to be 0, the total number of lines that can be tripped by the attacker is 0. Under this condition, the optimization problem yields the worst-case attack vector which maximizes flow on a target line when the attacker only changes states. Such an attack is equivalent to the worst-case unobservable FDI attack introduced in [13] . On the other hand, choosing N 1 , the l 1 -norm constraint of the attack vector, to be 0, leads to a topology only attack, i.e., the states are unchanged. The resulting problem is equivalent to the unobservable state-preserving topology attacks introduced in [8] . Finally, worst-case unobservable pure cyber state-and-topology attacks which maximize power flow on a target line can also be captured by this model. Different from cyber-physical attacks, for this class of attacks, the attacker knows the physical topology G and the false cyber topologyḠ. That is, the line status vector s is predetermined. Thus, the optimization problem should be reformulated with s as a parameter vector instead of a variable vector. In fact, such a class of attacks and the attack consequences have never been studied before. The results of this paper can be utilized to study this problem.
Remark 2: Note that the optimization problem ensures that the thermal limit of every line in the cyber system is satisfied. That is, the attack vector is designed in such a way that to the control center using the modified measurements, there is no violation in the outcome of the system response (DCOPF). Therefore, in the cyber system, it appears like that the target line will not have an overflow while in the physical system, since the both topology and states are different from those in the cyber system, such an overflow actually exists.
B. Step 2: Determine Initial Attack Vector
In this step, we determine the attack vector at event A 1 . As stated earlier, c 0 , the attack vector at A 1 , is chosen to ensure that the resulting load shifts lead to the optimal dispatch solved in Step 1, i.e., P * G . To this end, we use a two-stage optimization problem similar to Step 1 to determine c 0 . Note that since the switching attack line and attack sub-graph are both determined in Step 1, the dependency matrix between power injection and voltage angle, i.e., H 1 for the physical topology G at A 1 is known to the attacker, and the cyber loads are given by (10) .
As stated in Section III, the attacker only has access to the measurements inside S. Thus, the attacker cannot directly obtain the whole system physical states θ 0 . However, assuming B S and B NS represents the set of buses inside and outside S, respectively. The vector of cyber loads resulting from an unobservable attack satisfies the following relationship: represents the sub-matrices of H 1 andH 1 for the set of buses inside S, respectively. For the physical system states θ B S 0 , attacker uses the estimated statesθ B S 0 , to compute (36). The two-stage optimization can be written as follows:
where P * G1 is n g × 1 optimal generation vector solved in Step 1; α is n g × 1 dual variable vector of constraints (43). The objective (37) is to minimize the l 0 −norm of the attack vector. Constraint (37) represents load shift limitation. Constraints (40)−(43) represent the second stage DCOPF problem, which guarantees that the attack vector selected in the first stage leads to the optimal dispatch P * G1 . The l 0 −norm constraint can be relaxed to a linearized l 1 −norm constraint as (26). The objective can be represented as n∈L u n . This problem can then be converted to a single stage optimization problem using methods similar to those as in detailed Step 1.
C. Implementation
The method to construct an unobservable AC attack with a DC attack vector has been introduced in [13] for FDI attacks without topology alteration. In this paper, we focus on constructing AC unobservable cyber-physical attacks. The procedure is as follows: 1) Solve the Step 1 optimization offline to obtain the switching attack line t and the attack vector c. 2) Identify the attack sub-graph S with c and line t. where A m GN represents the m th row of A GN , Q G represents the reactive power generation vector, G mj + iB mj is the (m, j) th entry of the bus admittance matrix, and θ mj = θ m − θ j is the voltage angle difference between bus m and j,Br m is the set of branches connecting to bus m forḠ. These equations can be solved iteratively with Newton-Raphson method. 8) After updating the cyber states for the non-load buses, using equation (8) to calculate the AC attack for A 1 . 9) Repeat Steps 4)−7) (without solving Step 2 optimization) to construct AC attacks with c for A 2,...,T .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we test the effect of attacks designed with the two-step attack strategy for a nonlinear system model. The test system is the IEEE 24-bus reliable test system (RTS). We assume: (i) the system is operating under optimal power flow; and (ii) the loads of the system are constant and are equivalent to the historic load data that is assumed to be known to the attacker. To model realistic power systems, we assume that there are congestions prior to the attack and the attacker chooses one congested line as target to maximize power flow. We use MATPOWER to run AC power flow and AC OPF. The optimization problem is solved with CPLEX.
A. Solution for the Attack Designed with the Attack Strategy
The solution of the unobservable topology attack determined by the two-step attack strategy is tested in this subsection. In order to understand the worst-case effect of attacks, we assume there is a line congested prior to the physical attack. This is achieved in simulation by reducing the line rating to 95% of the base case power flow (apparent power) to create congestion. We exhaustively test all 38 lines as targets in the system and let ζ , the weight for the l 1 −norm term in the objective in (35), be 1% of the original power flow on each target line. Fig. 3 illustrates the maximal power flow (PF) and attack size (# of buses in sub-graph) for load shift bounds τ = 10%, total lines to physically attack N T = 1, and the l 1 -norm constraint N 1 = 0.06. The plot in Fig. 3(a) indicate the flow attack end of system event S 1 using attack vector from event A 1 . In Fig. 3(a) , we compare the physical power flow (apparent power, we denote it as AC PF) in each line to the power flow solved in linear model (we denote it as DC PF). In Fig. 3(b) , we plot the number of center buses, i.e., l 0 −norm of the attack vector, and the total number of buses inside the attack sub-graph for each target line. From Fig. 3(a) we can observe that the attack vector determined by the two-stage optimization problem cause overflows in 33 target lines in linear model, i.e., 86.84% of the attacks are successful. For all such successful attacks, using the attack vector to construct an attack in the nonlinear model, in Fig. 3(a) , the AC PF in each line tracks DC PF solved with the attack strategy. In particular, 2 cases with target lines 9 and 11, respectively, have no center buses, i.e., for these lines the state-preserving attacks introduced in [8] suffice. In Fig. 3(b) , we can observe that 72.73% of the successful attacks can be launched inside a sub-graph with less than 16 total buses.
In Fig. 4 , we illustrate the effect of the l 1 −norm constraint on the maximal power flow ( Fig. 4(a) ), the l 1 − and the l 0 −norms of the attack vector (Figs. 4(b) and 4(c), respectively), and the switching attack line ( Fig. 4(d) ) for target line 12 solved with Step 1 optimization. In each sub-figure, we illustrate the two solutions: one with ζ (red) and the other without ζ (black) in the objective function. From Figs. 4(a)−(c), we can see that for the solutions without l 1 −norm in objective (i.e., ζ = 0) as the l 1 −norm constraint is relaxed, the maximal target line power flow as well as the l 1 − and l 0 −norms of attack vector also increase. In contrast, for plots with the l 1 −norm in the objective, the l 1 −norm ensures that the vector with the smallest number of center buses is chosen. This in turn implies that when the l 1 −norm in the objective is tight, the resulting power flow may be smaller than that obtained without such a constraint. These differences are illustrated in Figs. 4(a)−(c). In Fig. 4(d) , we demonstrate that the switching attack line chosen by the optimization problem changes from line 2 to line 8 as the l 1 −norm constraint is relaxed. In general, tripping line 8 requires a large load shift, and thus, is only possible for larger l 1 −norm constraint as then the cyber load changes can be distributed over a larger number of load buses in the sub-graph.
B. Consequences of the Attack in the Nonlinear Model
In this subsection, we select a typical case to demonstrate the consequence of the unobservable state-and-topology cyber-physical attack determined by the attack strategy in the nonlinear system model. In this case, the target line is line 12 with τ = 10%, N T = 1, and N 1 = 0.06. Under this condition, the switching attack line is line 2.
For the chosen target line, after launching the physical attack at A 0 and injecting the initial cyber attack constructed with c 0 at A 1 , the active power generation dispatch for generators at bus 7 and 13 change from 215.69 MW and 230.96 MW to 200.69 MW and 245.67 MW, respectively (the dispatch of other generators remain unchanged). In the following events, as the attacker continues to inject the AC attacks constructed with attack vector c (determined by Step 1 optimization), the active power generation for these two set of generators are maintained at these values. Fig. 5 demonstrates the cyber and physical power flow variation during 20 system events. From Fig. 5 , we can observe that once the active power generation dispatch changes to the optimal dispatch and remains unchanged in the subsequent system events, the physical overflow in the target line will be maintained by injecting the AC attack constructed with attack vector c. The heat accumulation may eventually cause this line to overheat and then trip offline all the while remaining unobservable to the control center.
We compare the load shifts caused by the attacks in both the linear and nonlinear system models and find that the load shifts in the nonlinear system model track those in the linear system model for most of the successful attacks. The only two exceptions are for lines 13 (i.e., 20% load shift on a bus) and 23 (i.e., 15% load shift on a bus).
For the successful attacks with other target lines, we observe similar attack consequences in the nonlinear model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a class of unobservable topology attacks in which both topology data and states for a sub-graph of the network are changed by an attacker. We have proposed a two-step attack strategy to maximize the power flow on a target line subject to constraints on limited size of attack sub-graph and limited load shifts. We have shown that attacks designed with the proposed two-step attack strategy can cause physical line overloads in the IEEE 24-bus RTS even when the attack is subject to bounds on changes in load, for both linear and nonlinear models. The proportion of the successful attacks in the nonlinear system model is 86.84%, which shows the vulnerability of the system to such attacks.
A potential countermeasure is to use historical data to forecast and predict expected generation dispatch. The cyber load patterns created by the attack will in general be different from the normal load shift patterns that lead to the same dispatch plan. Thus, such forecasting can lead to detection of anomalies in both loads and dispatch. Yet another avenue is to study the worst-case attacks that trip multiple switching attack lines and maximize power flow on multiple target lines.
